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Abstract
Maximising expected value is the classic doctrine in choice theory under empirical un-
certainty, and a prominent proposal in the emerging philosophical literature on norm-
ative uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the standard of evaluation. But how should
Expectationalism be stated in general, when we can face both uncertainties simultan-
eously, as is common in life? Surprisingly, di¤erent possibilities arise, ranging from
Ex-Ante to Ex-Post Expectationalism, with several hybrid versions. The di¤erence lies
in the perspective from which expectations are taken, or equivalently the amount of
uncertainty packed into the prospect evaluated. Expectationalism thus faces the classic
dilemma between ex-ante and ex-post approaches, familiar elsewhere in ethics and ag-
gregation theory under uncertainty. We analyse the spectrum of expectational theories,
showing that they reach diverging evaluations, use di¤erent modes of reasoning, take
di¤erent attitudes to normative risk as well as empirical risk, but converge under an
interesting (necessary and su¢ cient) condition.
1 The problem
When evaluating choice options, we often face two types of uncertainty. Decision the-
ory has focused on empirical uncertainty: uncertainty about empirical facts, e.g., facts
about weather or election outcomes. Philosophers have recently turned to normative
uncertainty: uncertainty about the standard of evaluation, due for instance to com-
peting normative intuitions. Important contributions include Oddie (1994), Lockhart
(2000), Jackson and Smith (2006), MacAskill (2014, 2016), Bradley and Drechsler
(2014), Sepielli (2009), Weatherson (2014), Lazar (2017), Greaves and Cotton-Barratt
(2019), Tarsney (2018a, 2019), MacAskill and Ord (forth.), Riedener (2020), and Diet-
rich and Jabarian (2019a). Normative uncertainty is omnipresent in deliberation and
decision-making: parents may wonder how much they should value child autonomy,
1Acknowledgements to be added.
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even when certain about all relevant empirical facts; agents may wonder which con-
sequences matter most, and whether deontological considerations matter too; reason-
based agents (as in Dietrich and List 2013, 2017) may wonder which properties matter,
and how they matter; and so on.
Much can be debated about the metaphysical status of normative uncertainty: Is it
uncertainty about subjective or objective facts? About real or constructed facts? And
so forth. We put these important debates aside. But we stress two things: normative
uncertainty is meaningful under many interpretations and metaethical views, and it is
not formally reducible to standard choice-theoretic uncertainty.2
A prominent proposal in the theory of normative uncertainty is to maximise expec-
ted value across standards of evaluation, an approach pioneered in some of the cited
works, by Oddie, MacAskill, and Ord, respectively. Riedener (2020) gives a sophist-
icated axiomatic characterization. Much of todays debate focuses on whether this
approach to be called Expectationalism is justied. Expectationalism has for in-
stance been defended through analogies with empirical uncertainty and through formal
arguments (e.g., Riedeners work), but criticized for relying on a precise quantication
of normative uncertainty and on certain measurements and comparisons of value (e.g.,
Tarsney 2018b). Instead of addressing the important question Expectationalism or
not?, we shall assume Expectationalism, and ask a new question: Expected value
of what? A particular answer was so far taken for granted: expected value of the
option itself. We call this Standard Expectationalism. Standard Expectationalism is
hybrid in nature: it reasons empirically ex-ante, but normatively ex-post, as will be
shown. There are two non-hybrid incarnations of Expectationalism, Ex-Ante Expect-
ationalism and Ex-Post Expectationalism, which form the expected value of prospects
that respectively contain all uncertainty (empirical or normative) or no uncertainty.
Between these two extremes, there is a spectrum of hybrid (semi-ex-ante) versions of
Expectationalism.
The dilemma between ex-ante and ex-post reasoning is prominent in other elds
of formal ethics and aggregation theory; see Diamond (1976), McCarthy (2006, 2008,
2015), Fleurbaey (2010), Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2016), and Fleurbaey and Zuber
(2017). The theory of normative uncertainty cannot escape this dilemma. Just as social
egalitarians face a dilemma between ex-ante and ex-post equality, so expectationalists
about normative uncertainty face a dilemma between ex-ante, ex-post, and hybrid
formulations of Expectationalism. The dilemma always takes the same form: should
a given paradigm or ideal  for instance equality or (in our case) expected value 
be pursued from an ex-ante or ex-post perspective? The ex-ante/ex-post dilemma
reaches also into non-expectational approaches to normative uncertainty, such as max-
min approaches, of which one could again envision ex-ante, ex-post, and hybrid versions.
2Some decision-theoretic models can be reinterpreted in terms of normative uncertainty. Examples
are multi-utility models and Harsanyis (1978) impartial-observer model. But the attempt to simply re-
interpret choice-theoretic risk or uncertainty (in von-Neumann-Morgensterns or Savages framework)
normatively runs into formal problems. For instance, writing normative information into Savages
states implies letting states determine utilities, in ways not even compatible with standard state-
dependent utility theory (see however Riedener 2020 for a non-standard analysis). This would ul-
timately undermine the two-attitude make-up of choice theory, which is based on two independent
ingredients, beliefs and values (or formally, probabilities and utilities).
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But we here exclusively focus on Expectationalism. Our goal will not be to defend some
version of Expectationalism against others, but to put the spectrum of expectational
theories on the table. Deciding between expectational theories  choosing the right
degree of ex-post-ness might prove as di¢ cult as deciding between ex-ante and ex-
post egalitarianism.
Although existing work has assumed a specic formulation of Expectationalism, it
may be taken to address Expectationalism in general, because most arguments raised
for or against Expectationalism do not hinge on that formulation. Our contribution
is thus not to undermine existing arguments, but to raise the problem of the right
formulation of Expectationalism.
The paper has a simple structure. The rest of this section introduces the simplest
possible formal framework for capturing normative and (where needed) empirical un-
certainty. Section 2 introduces four salient expectational theories four solutions to the
problem expectation of what?. Section 3 denes these four theories formally. Section
4 illustrates how they reach diverging evaluations and take di¤erent attitudes to risk.
Section 5 denes Expectationalism in general, going beyond the four special theories.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
We now present the formal ingredients one by one.
The objects of evaluation. We consider a non-empty set A of objects of evaluation, called
options. They could be policy measures, social arrangements, income distributions
etc. So far we leave open whether options contain empirical risk.
Competing valuations. Options have uncertain value. Following the expected-value
approach, our notion of value is absolute, not comparative (ordinal). We thus repres-
ent a possible standard of evaluation by a function v, called a valuation, assigning to
each option a in A a value v(a) in R. The agent hesitates between certain valuations.
Let V be their set, formally a nite non-empty set of functions from A to R. Let us
give moral examples, without suggesting a restriction to moral choice. V could con-
tain a utilitarian, an egalitarian, and some deontological valuation. Alternatively, V
could consist of similarvaluations which di¤er only in a parameter: prioritarian valu-
ations with di¤erent degrees of prioritarianism, or egalitarian valuations with di¤erent
degrees of inequality-aversion, or valuations of intertemporal well-being with di¤erent
discounting of future well-being, or valuations (of risky options) with di¤erent degrees
of risk-aversion, etc. In such parametric examples, normative uncertainty boils down to
uncertainty about the correct parameter value: the correct amount of prioritarianism,
inequality-aversion, discounting, risk-aversion, etc.3
Credences in valuations. You assign to each valuation v in V a subjective correctness
probability Pr(v)  0, where Pv2V Pr(v) = 1. Probabilities capture degrees of belief
about value.
3Our examples show that normative uncertainty comes in two species: mere parameter uncertainty
and fundamental model uncertainty. A similar distinction is made in other elds, especially statistics
and macroeconomics (e.g., Hansen and Sargent 2001).
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Meta-value. Given these credences, how should you evaluate options overall? An an-
swer takes the form of a meta-valuation or theory, formally a function assigning to
each option in A a (meta-)value in R. To distinguish meta-valuations from valu-
ations, we denote them by upper-case letters like V . Two examples su¢ ce for now.
Standard Expectationalism evaluates options a 2 A by their expected value: V (a) =P
v2V Pr(v)v(a). Another (decidedly non-expectational) theory evaluates options a 2
A by their minimal possible value: V (a) = minv2V:Pr(v)6=0 v(a).
Some would call our theories meta-theories, and our valuations rst-order theor-
ies. Nothing hinges on having dened theories as value functions rather than value
orders on A; this is for convenience. Readers who prefer an ordinal notion of meta-value
can replace our meta-valuations by the orders they induce.
Measurability and comparability of value. As usual in the expectational approach,
we take rst-order value to be measurable and comparable across valuations. Full
measurability makes it meaningful to say that an option x has value 7 under a valuation
v (v(x) = 7), or is twice as valuable as another option y (v(x) = 2v(y)), or exceeds
zs value by 2 (v(x)   v(z) = 2), etc. Full comparability makes it meaningful to say
that two valuations v and v0 assign same value to option x (v(x) = v0(x)), or same
value gain to the change from option x to option y (v(y)  v(x) = v0(y)  v0(x)), etc.4
Such assumptions are strong and debatable. They can be relaxed, in ways that di¤er
across versions of Expectationalism.5 We set aside when and how measurability and
comparability can be justied,6 and how they could be relaxed by di¤erent versions of
Expectationalism.
Adding empirical uncertainty: options as lotteries. The above framework is complete
as a model of purely normative uncertainty; empirical uncertainty in options is allowed,
but not modelled. To add empirical uncertainty explicitly, we hereafter assume that
options in A are lotteries on a given set X of outcomes, i.e., functions a from X to [0; 1]
such that
P
x2X a(x) = 1, where a(x) is non-zero for only nitely many x in X. An
option is riskless if some outcome has probability one, and risky otherwise. Outcomes
represent empirical states of a¤airs after resolution of empirical uncertainty. They may
be consequencesof actions or go beyond consequences, depending on what we wish to
model. Interpreting outcomes as consequences limits us to consequentialist valuations,
hence to normative uncertainty between types of consequentialism. But if outcomes go
beyond consequences, e.g., by capturing intentions or the choice context, then the model
is open to non-consequentialist valuations, hence to normative uncertainty between
possibly non-consequentialist valuations.7
We do not require that all lotteries on X count as options, i.e., belong to A. But
4Comparability and measurability are addressed by Bossert and Weymark (2004), and in the context
of normative uncertainty by, e.g., Ross (2006), Sepielli (2009) and Tarsney (2018b).
5For instance, all versions need only a¢ ne measurements of value, and Standard Expectationalism
needs only unit comparisons, not level comparisons.
6Justifying cross-valuation comparisons is easier if V consists of theories of similar type, e.g., egal-
itarian theories with di¤erent degrees of inequality-aversion.
7Normative uncertainty between non-consequentialist valuations is addressed by Barry and Tomlin
(2016) and Tenenbaum (2017).
4
we assume that A contains at least the riskless lotteries, which assign probability one
to some outcome. We take valuations v in V to also evaluate outcomes x in X, by
dening v(x) as v(a) where a is the riskless option corresponding to x.
Valuations of vNM type and of non-vNM type. A valuation v in V could have the
notorious von-Neumann-Morgenstern property: it could be vNM. Being vNM means
evaluating options a in A by the expected value of the outcome: v(a) =
P
x2X a(x)v(x).
Ever since the Harsanyi-Sen debate, it is controversial whether the vNM property is an
arbitrary or an inherently necessary feature of value.8 Our model is ecumenical: the
agent could be utterly certain of the vNM Hypothesis, by having positive credence
only in vNM valuations in V; or utterly certain of the converse, by having positive
credence only in non-vNM valuations in V; or genuinely uncertain, by having positive
credence in both types of valuations. Being ecumenical is important because we (as
modellers) should not project our own view w.r.t. the vNM Hypothesis upon the agent
to be modelled. We should for instance not force V to contain only vNM valuations or
only non-vNM valuations, because this would restrict the entire framework to agents
who are utterly certain of the vNM Hypothesis or of its converse, thereby excluding
an important kind of normative uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the vNM Hy-
pothesis. There is a deeper methodological point: the eld or theory of normative
uncertainty is engaged in meta-normativity and should thus avoid prejudging rst-
order normative questions. It should take peoples normative beliefs and uncertainties
at face value (without forbiddingsome of them), and tell people how to respond to
their own uncertainties. Earlier work about normative uncertainty has often restricted
attention to vNM valuations. This can be legitimate as a working assumption, but we
wish to overcome this restriction.
2 Expected value of what?
Expectational theories evaluate options by the expected value of some object. That
object is the prospect o¤ered by the option, but there are di¤erent types of prospect:
the ex-ante prospect, the ex-post prospect, and hybrid prospects taking a partly ex-ante
and partly ex-post perspective.
Think of prospects as probability distributions. More precisely, one can dene pro-
spects equivalently as distributions over empirical-normative worlds (world prospects)
or distributions over resulting value levels (value prospects). We shall later only work
with value prospects. But let us start with world prospects. An empirical-normative
world for short, a world is a pair (x; v) of an outcome in X (an empirical world)
and a valuation in V (a normative world). In a world, all empirical or normative
uncertainty is resolved. A world prospect is a probability distribution over worlds, rep-
resenting how likely worlds are (where for simplicity only nitely many worlds have
non-zero probability). Each option a generates an (ex-ante) world prospect, under
which the probability of a world (x; v) is the product a(x)Pr(v) of the probabilities of
8See Broome (1991), Weymark (1991), Nissan-Rozen (2015) and Greaves (2017) for analyses with
deviating conclusions.
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outcome x (under option a) and valuation v. This world prospect is ex-ante because no
uncertainty is resolved; ex-post and hybrid world prospects will be dened in a moment.
We can now give four possible answers to the question Expected value of what?,
hence four ways to reason and ultimately to assign meta-value to a given option a. We
keep the answers informal; formal denitions follow in Section 3.
 Normatively ex-post reasoning : You place yourself in a normatively ex-post and
empirically ex-ante position, by considering a given valuation v and the lottery
of empirical outcomes generated by option a. So you face the normatively ex-post
world prospect, in which v has (marginal) probability one and any outcome x in
X has (marginal) probability a(x). It yields the value v(a). Stepping outside this
position, you then form the expectation of the value v(a) across valuations v in
V. This is Standard Expectationalism.
 Ex-post reasoning : You place yourself in a fully ex-post position, by considering a
given outcome x and a given valuation v. So you face the ex-post world prospect,
in which world (x; v) has probability one. It yields the value v(x). Stepping
outside this position, you then form the expectation of the value v(x) across
worlds (x; v) in X  V. This is Ex-Post Expectationalism.
 Ex-ante reasoning : You place yourself in the fully ex-ante position, in which both
parts of the empirical-normative world are unknown. So you face the ex-ante
world prospect, dened above. You then form the expected value of this ex-ante
prospect; how this works is shown in Section 3. This is Ex-Ante Expectationalism.
 Empirically ex-post reasoning : You place yourself in an empirically ex-post and
normatively ex-ante position, by considering a given outcome x and the probabil-
ity distribution over valuations Pr reecting your normative uncertainty. So you
face the empirically ex-post world prospect, in which x has (marginal) probability
of one and any valuation v has (marginal) probability Pr(v). You then form the
expected value of this world prospect, in a way shown in Section 3. This is Re-
verse Expectationalism. It is the reverse or dualof Standard Expectationalism,
as it reasons ex-ante where Standard Expectationalism reasons ex-post, and vice
versa.
normatively ex-post normatively ex-ante
empirically ex-post Ex-Post Expectationalism Reverse Expectationalism
empirically ex-ante Standard Expectationalism Ex-Ante Expectationalism
Table 1: Four expectational theories and their modes of reasoning
These four answers to the question Expected value of what?were given in the form
of world prospects, but they can be redescribed as value prospects. Value prospects
are prospects of achieving certain value levels (not worlds) with certain probabilities,
for instance achieving value 4 with probability 1/2 and value 0 with probability 1/2.
A world prospect immediately induces a value prospect (mathematically by taking the
image of the world prospect under the mapping (x; v) 7! v(x) from worlds to resulting
values). For instance, the ex-post world prospect under which world (x; v) is certain
induces the riskless value prospect under which the value v(x) is certain.
Formally, a value prospect is simply a lottery over real numbers, i.e., a function p
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assigning to each value k in R a probability p(k) in [0; 1] such that
P
k2R p(k) = 1, where
(for simplicity) only nitely many values k in R have non-zero probability p(k). Each
option a generates a value prospect, denoted pa. It reects empirical and normative
uncertainty, as the resulting value v(x) depends on both x and v, hence on the empirical-
normative world (x; v). The probability that the resulting value is (say) 4 is the sum-
total probability of all worlds (x; v) such that v(x) = 4. The just-dened value prospect
pa of an option a is an ex-ante construct: no uncertainty is yet resolved. Indeed, pa
is simply the value prospect induced by the ex-ante world prospect. Partly or fully
ex-post value prospects are denable by eliminating one or both sources of uncertainty.
We now formally dene the four kinds of value prospect. They correspond exactly
to the four kinds of world prospect above, respectively:9
 The (ex-ante) value prospect of option a 2 A is the value prospect pasuch
that any value k 2 R has probability
pa(k) = probability that a leads to value k=
X
(x;v)2XV:v(x)=k
a(x)Pr(v)| {z }
prob. of (x;v)
:
 The (normatively ex-post) value prospect of option a 2 A given valu-
ation v 2 V is the value prospect pa;vsuch that any value k 2 R has probability
pa;v(k) = probability that a leads to value k given v =
X
x2X:v(x)=k
a(x):
 The (empirically ex-post) value prospect given outcome x 2 X is the
value prospect pxsuch that any value k 2 R has probability:
px(k) = probability that x leads to value k =
X
v2V:v(x)=k
Pr(v).
 The (ex-post) value prospect given both x 2 X and v 2 V is the riskless
value prospect px;vunder which the value is v(x) with probability one.10
3 Four expectational theories
We now formally dene the four expectational theories discussed in Section 2. Each
takes the expected value of a certain prospect, as is either clear by denition or estab-
lished in Theorem 1. We begin with the two theories whose denitions do not explicitly
refer to prospects.
Standard Expectationalism (EVstan): The meta-value of an option a 2 A is the
expected value of the option itself:
EVstan(a) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(a) (standard expected value).
9Compare our value prospects with Rowe and Voorhoeves (2018) well-being prospects in a context
of health ethics under (purely empirical) risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity.
10The value prospects px and px;v can be regarded as special cases of the value prospects pa and
pa;v, by choosing a to be the riskless option that yields x for sure.
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This theory reasons empirically ex-ante, because the object whose average evalu-
ation it forms is the option, which captures empirical risk. The second theory reasons
fully ex-post: it forms the average evaluation of the outcome, which no longer contains
empirical risk. This requires averaging across both outcomes and valuations, hence
across empirical-normative worlds (x; v). Formally:
Ex-Post Expectationalism (EVpost): The meta-value of an option a 2 A is the
expected value of the outcome:
EVpost(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)| {z }
prob. of (x;v)
v(x) (expected nal value).
The third theory reasons fully ex-ante. It operates neither at the ex-post level of
outcomes (EVpost), nor at the semi-ex-post level of options (EVstan), but at the level of
ex-ante value prospects. But how can valuations v in V evaluate value prospects rather
than options, i.e., how should we dene v(p) for a value prospect p? We of course
identify v(p) with v(a) for any option a in A chosen such as to have the value prospect
p given v. If for instance p is the value prospect the value is 1 or 0 equiprobably,
then we pick an option a which equiprobably has an outcome x of value v(x) = 1 or
an outcome y of value v(y) = 0, and dene v(p) as v(a). Formally, the value of a value
prospect p under a valuation v in V denoted v(p) is the value v(a) of options a 2 A
such that pa;v = p. This denition implicitly rests on an assumption that we shall
maintain for the rest of the paper:
Assumption: Hereafter, for each valuation v in V and value prospect p we assume that
(i) A contains an option a whose value prospect given v, pa;v, is p; and (ii) any two
such options a in A have same value v(a).
Condition (i) is a typical richness assumption: the set of options A should be
su¢ ciently inclusive, i.e., contain options with any given value prospects. Condition
(ii) is a consistency assumption on the valuations in V. It is compatible with most or
all rst-order theories one would naturally want to consider.
Ex-Ante Expectationalism (EVante): The meta-value of an option a 2 A is the
expected value of the ex-ante prospect:
EVante(a) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(pa) (expected ex-ante value).
Note an intended peculiarity: v(pa) uses a given valuation (v) to evaluate a prospect
(pa) which carries normative uncertainty about the correct valuation. Precisely this is
what ex-ante reasoning should do, as it should ask how attractive each ex-ante prospect
is on average across possible valuations.
The fourth theory calculates the average evaluation of yet another object: neither
the option (EVstan), nor the outcome (EVpost), nor the ex-ante prospect (EVante), but
the empirically ex-post value prospect. This requires averaging across outcomes and
valuations, hence across empirical-normative worlds (x; v).
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Reverse Expectationalism (EVrev): The meta-value of an option a 2 A is the
expected value of the empirically ex-post prospect:
EVrev(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)| {z }
prob. of (x;v)
v(px) (reverse expected value).
This theory reverses the reasoning of Standard Expectationalism: it reasons empir-
ically ex-post rather than normatively ex-post.
The following theorem re-expresses the four theories in a comparable format, show-
ing that they only di¤er in the locusof expectation-taking, i.e., in the sort of prospect
whose expected value they maximise:
Theorem 1 Each expectational theory V 2 fEVante; EVpost; EVstan; EVrevg evaluates
any option a 2 A by the expected value of a specic value prospect, i.e.,
V (a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)| {z }
prob. of (x;v)
v(p);
where pstands for the
 ex-ante value prospect pa if V = EVante,
 ex-post value prospect px;v if V = EVpost,
 normatively ex-post value prospect pa;v if V = EVstan,
 empirically ex-post value prospect px if V = EVrev.
4 Illustration of these expectational theories and their
risk attitudes
Suppose you hesitate between just two valuations, v and v0. You have credence 12 in
each of them, and credence 0 in all other valuations in V (if any). Both valuations v
and v0 are risk-averse. So you are sure that risk-aversion is correct: your normative
uncertainty does not pertain to the risk-attitude (more on risk attitudes in the next
section). You now compare two options. Both options lead to the value prospect
value 4 with probability 12 , value 0 with probability
1
2, denoted 450%050%, but for very
di¤erent reasons. The rst option involves only normative risk: it surely has outcome x,
whose value is either v(x) = 4 or v0(x) = 0. The second option involves only empirical
risk: it has either outcome y or outcome z (equiprobably), where it is uncontroversial
between v and v0 that y has value 4 and z has value 0. By risk-aversion, the option is
evaluated below the expected resulting value of 124 +
1
20 = 2; let the value be 1 under
both v and v0. The gap from 1 to 2 is a risk penaltyor risk premium.
Table 2 displays the (ex-ante and normatively ex-post) value prospects of options
and the evaluations of options by both rst-order theories and the four expectational
theories. The four meta-evaluations are obtained as follows:
 Standard Expectationalism forms the average value of the option. This yields
1
24 +
1
20 = 2 or
1
21 +
1
21 = 1, respectively.
9
value prospect evaluation by
given v given v0 ex-ante v v0 EVstan EVpost EVante EVrev
option 1 4100% 0100% 450%050% 4 0 2 2 1 1
option 2 450%050% 450%050% 450%050% 1 1 1 2 1 2
Table 2: Four expectational theories applied to two concrete options
 Ex-Post Expectationalism forms the average value of the outcome. In principle,
this requires averaging across valuations in V (normative uncertainty) and out-
comes (empirical uncertainty). Yet our options e¤ectively need just one dimension
of averaging, as they have just one source of uncertainty. The rst option has
just normative uncertainty: it surely has outcome x, of value 4 or 0. The second
option has just empirical uncertainty: it has outcome y of sure value 4 or outcome
z of sure value 0. Each option thus has the same average value of the outcome:
1
24 +
1
20 = 2.
 Ex-Ante Expectationalism forms the average value of the ex-ante value pro-
spect, i.e., of 450%050% for each option. So we must calculate
1
2v(450%050%) +
1
2v
0(450%050%). What are v(450%050%) and v0(450%050%)? As 450%050% is op-
tion 2s value prospect given v, v(450%050%) = v(option 2) = 1. As 450%050%
is also option 2s value prospect given v0, v0(450%050%) = v0(option 2) = 1. So,
1
2v(450%050%) +
1
2v
0(450%050%) = 121 +
1
21 = 1.
 Reverse Expectationalism forms the average value of the empirically ex-post value
prospect. Like for EVpost, this can require averaging across both outcomes and
valuations, but for our two options one dimension of averaging drops out, as
option 1 is empirically riskless and option 2 is normatively riskless. Option 1
surely has outcome x, whose value prospect 450%050% is evaluated at 1 by both
(risk-averse) valuations, as just seen. The average value is thus 121 +
1
21 = 1.
Option 2 either has outcome y, whose value prospect 4100% has value 4 under
both v and v0; or has outcome z, whose value prospect 0100% has value 0 under
both v and v0. The average value is thus 124 +
1
20 = 2.
Interestingly, the reasoning mode the version of Expectationalism adopted de-
termines the risk attitude underlying our (meta-)evaluations. We shall explain this
only informally; the relevant denitions and formal results are given in a separate pa-
per dedicated to risk attitudes (Dietrich and Jabarian 2019b). By riskwe mean risk
about resulting value, such as (in our example) the risk of achieving value 4 or 0. Such
risk can have empirical or normative origin: it can stem from an uncertain outcome
(empirical uncertainty) or an uncertain value of the outcome (normative uncertainty)
or even a combination. A (meta-)theory is risk-averse if its evaluation of options con-
tains a penalty for risk, i.e., falls below the value achieved in expectation. The theory is
risk-neutral if risk is not penalized. One might feel uncomfortable with imposing a par-
ticular risk attitude on meta-evaluations: where would the justication come from? An
interesting alternative to imposition is to adopt whatever risk attitude you believe to
be correct for rst-order valuations: if you are certain of a particular risk attitude such
as risk-aversion, i.e., hold positive credence only in valuations with that risk-attitude,
then your meta-evaluations adopt that same risk-attitude. We call this risk-impartiality
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because your meta-level risk attitude defers to your risk-attitudinal judgments. In our
example, you are certain that risk-aversion is correct, as you are certain that one of
the risk-averse valuations v and v0 is correct; so a risk-impartial theory is risk-averse.
Risk-impartiality seems to be a natural default, at least in the absence of a convincing
argument for any particular meta-level risk attitudes (see Dietrich and Jabarian 2019b
for risk-impartiality in cases of not being certain of any given risk-attitude).11
Which risk-attitudes do our four theories have? As summarized in Table 3, one
is risk-neutral (no penalty for risk), one is risk-impartial (deference to risk-attitudinal
judgments), and two have hybrid risk-attitudes, i.e., are risk-neutral or risk-impartial
depending on the origin of risk. To explain why, we use our example, in which all
neutral to normative risk impartial to normative risk
neutral to empirical risk Ex-Post Expectationalism Reverse Expectationalism
impartial to empirical risk Standard Expectationalism Ex-Ante Expectationalism
Table 3: The risk attitudes of the four meta-theories in our example with risk-averse
rst-order theories
valuations are risk-averse, so that risk-impartiality becomes risk-aversion.
 Standard Expectationalism applies the valuations v and v0 to the option, which
captures only empirical risk. This leads (by risk-aversion of v and v0) to a penalty
or discount for empirical risk only: the theory is averse to empirical risk, but
neutral to normative risk. This explains why in Table 2 the normatively risky
option 1 gets the undiscounted value of 2, while the empirically risky option 2
gets the discounted value of 1.
 Ex-Post Expectationalism applies the two valuations to the outcome, which cap-
tures no risk. So no risk is penalized: the theory is globally risk-neutral. This
explains why both options in Table 2 get the undiscounted value of 2.
 Ex-Ante Expectationalism applies the two valuations to the ex-ante value pro-
spect, which captures risk of both origins. So all risk is penalized: the theory is
globally risk-averse. This explains why both options in Table 2 get the discounted
value of 1.
 Reverse Expectationalism applies the two valuations to the empirically ex-post
value prospect, which captures only normative risk. So only normative risk is
penalized: the theory is averse only to normative risk. This explains why in
Table 2 only the normatively risky option gets the discounted value of 1.
5 The full taxonomy of Expectationalism
We now come to the unication. We introduce a single generic expectational theory,
of which our four earlier theories are nothing but special cases. The generic theory
depends on a parameter that determines the reasoning mode, i.e., the extent of ex-
post-ness. Particular choices of this parameter yield our four special expectational
11Risk attitudes have been analysed extensively in the di¤erent context of purely empirical uncer-
tainty. For di¤erent accounts, see Weirich (1986), Buchak (2013), Bradley and Stefánsson (2017) and
Baccelli (2018).
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theories, and all other expectational theories. So there are not just four expectational
theories, but a large and unied class of expectational theories.
The parameter determining the expectational theory is the type of information re-
lative to which reasoning is ex-post: full information yields Ex-Post Expectationalism,
no information yields Ex-Ante Expectationalism, purely normative information yields
Standard Expectationalism, purely empirical information yields Reverse Expectation-
alism, and yet other types of information yield other expectational theories. We model
an information by an empirical-normative event I  X  V, containing the empirical-
normative worlds (x; v) which are consistent with the information. The information of
a full empirical-normative world (x; v) is I = f(x; v)g, containing just one world; the
vacuous or tautological information is I = XV, containing all worlds; the information
of a valuation v is I = Xfvg, containing worlds of type (; v); and the information of
an outcome x is I = fxg  V, containing worlds of type (x; ). Recall that each option
a generates a world prospect, i.e., a probability function over worlds. Let us denote it
by Pa. The probability of a world (x; v) is Pa(x; v) = a(x)Pr(v), the product of the
probabilities of x and v.
To dene our general expectational theory, we need a general notion of value pro-
spect, which has an arbitrary degree of ex-post-ness, i.e., conditionalises on an arbitrary
information I. We call it the ex-I value prospect, as it is the value prospect from the
perspective of I. Formally, for any option a 2 X and information I  X  V (of
non-zero probability Pa(I)), the ex-I value prospect of a is the value prospect pa;I such
that the probability of a value level k 2 R is the probability that a results in value k
given I:
pa;I(k) = probability of nal value k given I =
prob. of [I & nal value k]
prob. of I
=
Pa(f(x; v) 2 I : v(x) = kg)
Pa(I)
:
This general notion of value prospect encompasses our four earlier notions:
Proposition 1 The ex-I value prospect pa;I of an option a 2 A given an information
I  X  V (of non-zero probability Pa(I)) coincides with the
 ex-ante value prospect pa if I = X  V (no information),
 ex-post value prospect px;v if I = f(x; v)g (information of a full world (x; v)),
 normatively ex-post value prospect pa;v if I = Xfvg (information of a valuation
v),
 empirically ex-post value prospect px if I = fxgV (information of an empirical
outcome x).
Recall that each valuation v in V can evaluate not just options, but also value
prospects. So we can form v(pa;I), which tells how valuable v nds the prospect of
option a given I. We call v(pa;I) as ex-I value of a, according to v.
An expectational theory reasons ex-post w.r.t. some type of information. A type
of information is represented by an information partition: a partition I of the set
X  V of empirical-normative worlds. I contains those information I on which the
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reasoner conditionalises when conceptualizing options as prospects. As such, I denes
a degree of ex-post-ness of reasoning. Fully ex-post reasoning is dened by the nest
information partition I = ff(x; v)g : (x; v) 2 X  Vg; fully ex-ante reasoning by
the coarsest partition I = fX  Vg; normatively ex-post reasoning by the partition
I = fX  fvg : v 2 Vg into valuation events; empirically ex-post reasoning by the
partition I = ffxg  V : x 2 Xg into outcome events; and other hybrid reasoning
modes by other partitions.
An information partition I a degree of ex-post-ness determines an expectational
theory, which evaluates options by the expected value (across empirical-normative
worlds) of the prospect w.r.t. I. Formally:
Ex-I Expectationalism (EVI): The meta-value of an option a 2 A is the expected
value of the ex-I prospect:12
EVI(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)| {z }
prob. of (x;v)
v(pa;I(x;v)) (expected ex-I value)
where I(x; v) is the information in empirical-normative world (x; v), i.e., the I 2 I
containing (x; v).
We can now dene Expectationalismas a general approach:
Expectationalism: Meta-value is given by some expectational theory, i.e., by Ex-I
Expectationalism for some information type I (some partition of X  V).
Our four earlier theories are special cases, obtained by plugging in certain inform-
ation types, i.e., certain degrees of ex-post reasoning:
Theorem 2 Ex-I Expectationalism coincides with
 Ex-Ante Expectationalism if I = fX  Vg (no information),
 Ex-Post Expectationalism if I = ff(x; v)g : (x; v) 2 X  Vg (full information),
 Standard Expectationalism if I = fX  fvg : v 2 Vg (normative information),
 Reverse Expectationalism if I = ffxg  V : x 2 Xg (empirical information).
Are there any circumstances under which it becomes irrelevant how you reason?
That is, can it happen that all degrees of ex-post reasoning extensionally yield the same
expectational theory, hence the same evaluative judgments, albeit through di¤erent
procedures? This question obviously matters. If all reasoning modes were extensionally
equivalent, then you could reason as you wish or nd easiest. The question has a sharp
answer: the reasoning mode is irrelevant if and only if you have full credence in the
vNM Hypothesis, i.e., assign zero probability to all valuations in V that are not vNM
(von-Neumann-Morgenstern). Recall that vNM valuations v evaluate options a in
A by the expected value of the outcome: v(a) =
P
x2X a(x)v(x). See Section 1 for
discussion.
12Although pa;I(x;v) becomes undened in the zero-probability case Pa(I(x; v)) = 0, no ambiguity
arises. Whenever pa;I(x;v) is undened, the value v(pa;I(x;v)) can be interpreted arbitrarily, as it is
multiplied by 0 (= Pa(x; v) = a(x)Pr(v)) and so has no e¤ect.
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Theorem 3 All expectational theories EVI coincide (i.e., the reasoning mode has no
e¤ect) if and only if you are certain of the vNM Hypothesis, i.e., Pr(v) = 0 for all
valuations v in V that are not vNM.
Some scholars have defended the vNM Hypothesis (and many have assumed it to
simplify models). But few of them would go so far as to be utterly certain of that
hypothesis. These few people can safely reason as they wish: their reasoning mode
has no e¤ect by Theorem 3. All others, who have at least some doubt in the vNM
Hypothesis, face the hard choice between reasoning modes, i.e., between expectational
theories.
6 Conclusion
There is more than one expected-value theory for evaluating options. The various ex-
pectational theories di¤er ethically, by reaching di¤erent evaluations; procedurally, by
using di¤erent reasoning; and risk-attitudinally, by taking di¤erent attitudes towards
empirical as well as normative risk. But all theories take the expected value of some type
of prospect. At the two ends of the spectrum, Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Expectationalism
respectively take the expected value of the ex-ante or ex-post prospect, hence reason
from the perspective before or after resolution of uncertainty of any type (empirical or
normative). Standard Expectationalism lies in between: it takes the expected value of
the option itself, thereby e¤ectively reasoning from an empirically ex-ante, but norm-
atively ex-post perspective. Reverse Expectationalism does the opposite: it reasons
empirically ex-post, but normatively ex-ante. The four mentioned theories stand out
as salient, but they are just examples. In general, to any type of information (technic-
ally, any information partitionof the set of empirical-normative worlds) corresponds
an expectational theory, which reasons ex-post w.r.t. this information.
The classical question Expectationalism or not? should therefore be complemen-
ted by another pressing question: Expected value of what? The problem of deciding
between versions of Expectationalism might prove to be as di¢ cult as the classic prob-
lem of deciding between ex-ante and ex-post versions of egalitarianism or perhaps
even more di¢ cult, as we face normative uncertainty besides empirical uncertainty.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. Let a 2 X. Firstly,
EVante(a) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(pa) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(pa)
X
x2X
a(x) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa);
where the second equality holds as
P
x2X a(x) = 1. Secondly,
EVstan(a) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(a) =
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(pa;v)
=
X
v2V
Pr(v)v(pa;v)
X
x2X
a(x) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa;v);
where the second equality holds because v(pa;x) = v(a), and the third because
P
x2X a(x) =
1. Thirdly, the expression for EVrev(a) holds by denition. Finally,
EVpost(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v) v(x)|{z}
=v(px;v)
=
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v(px;v): 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an option a 2 A and an information I  X  V such
that Pa(I) 6= 0. As our denitions easily imply, if I = X  V then pa;I = pa, while if
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I = f(x; v)g where (x; v) 2 X  V then pa;I = px;v. If I = X  fvg where v 2 V, then
pa;I = pa;v because for all k 2 R
pa;I(k) =
Pa(fx 2 X : v(x) = kg  fvg)
Pr(v)
=
a(fx 2 X : v(x) = kg)Pr(v)
Pr(v)
= a(fx 2 X : v(x) = kg) =
X
x2X:v(x)=k
a(x) = pa;v(k):
Finally, if I = fxg  V where x 2 X, then pa;I = px because for all k 2 R
pa;I(k) =
Pa(fxg  fv 2 V : v(x) = kg)
a(x)
=
a(x)Pr(fv 2 V : v(x) = kg)
a(x)
= Pr(fv 2 V : v(x) = kg) =
X
v2V:v(x)=k
Pr(v) = px(k): 
Proof of Theorem 2. Regarding EVante, for each option a 2 A
EVante(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa) = EVI(a) for I = fX  Vg.
where the rst identity holds by Theorem 1 and the second identity holds because by
Proposition 1 we can replace pa by pa;XV = pa;I(x;v). Analogously, for each a 2 A
EVstan(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v( pa|{z}
pa;Xfvg
) = EVI(a) for I = fX  fvg : v 2 Vg
EVrev(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v( px|{z}
pa;fxgV
) = EVI(a) for I = ffxg  V : x 2 Xg
EVpost(a) =
X
(x;v)2XV
a(x)Pr(v)v( px;v|{z}
pa;f(x;v)g
) = EVI(a) for I = ff(x; v)g : (x; v) 2 X  Vg;
where on each line the two identities use Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, respectively. 
The proof of Theorem 3 begins with a lemma.
Lemma 1 A valuation v 2 V is vNM if and only if it evaluates value prospects by their
expectation, i.e., v(p) = Exp(p) (=
P
k2R p(k)k) for all value prospects p.
Proof. 1. First, let v 2 V be vNM. We x a value prospect p and prove that v(p) =
Exp(p). Pick an option a 2 A such that pa;v = p. We have
Exp(p) =
X
k2R
kp(k) =
X
k2R
k
X
x2X:v(x)=k
a(x) =
X
k2R
X
x2X:v(x)=k
a(x)k =
X
x2X
a(x)v(x);
where the second equality uses that p(k) = pa;v(k) =
P
x2X:v(x)=k a(x), and the third
and fourth equalities follow by reordering terms. The last expression equals v(a) as v
is vNM, which equals v(p) by choice of a.
2. Conversely, assume v(p) = Exp(p) for all value prospects p. We let a 2 A and
show v(a) =
P
x2X a(x)v(x). Dening p as pa;v, we have Exp(p) =
P
x2X a(x)v(x),
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as in part 1 of the proof. So it remains to show v(a) = Exp(p). This holds because
v(a) = v(p) (as p = pa;v) and v(p) = Exp(p) (by hypothesis). 
Proof Theorem 3. We shall use standard measure-theoretic arguments.
1. Assume Pr(v) = 0 for all non-vNM valuations v 2 V. Fix an option a 2 A. We
show that EVI(a) is independent of the information partition I. On the set of worlds
XV, consider the probability distribution Pa (the world prospect of a) and the random
variables x : X  V ! X; (x; v) 7! x and v : X  V ! V; (x; v) 7! v. Combining
these variables yields a third variable, v(x), given by X  V ! R; (x; v) 7! v(x)
and representing resulting value. The value prospect pa equals the distribution of the
variable v(x), and so its expectation is Exp(pa) = ExpPa(v(x)). More generally, for
any information I  X  V (such that Pa(I) 6= 0), the value prospect pa;I equals the
distribution of v(x) conditional on I, and so Exp(pa;I) = ExpPa(v(x)jI). Now for any
information partition I (identiable with the variable mapping (x; v) to I(x; v)),
EVI(a) = ExpPa(v(pa;I)) by denition
= ExpPa(Exp(pa;I)) by Lemma 1
= ExpPa(ExpPa(v(x)jI)) as Exp(pa;I) = ExpPa(v(x)jI)
= ExpPa(v(x)) by the law of iterated expectations,
where Lemma 1 is applicable as valuations generated by v (with non-zero probability)
are vNM. The last expression for EVI(a) shows that EVI(a) is independent of I.
2. Conversely, let V contain a non-vNM valuation ~v of probability Pr(~v) 6= 0.
As ~v is non-vNM, we may pick an option a 2 A such that ~v(a) 6= Px2X a(x)~v(x):
Denote the information of valuation ~v by I = X  f~vg. We construct two information
partitions I1 and I2 for which EVI1(a) 6= EVI2(a). Let I1 and I2 coincide outside I
and be, respectively, maximally coarse or maximally ne within I. So I1 = I0 [ fIg
and I2 = I0 [ ff(x; v)g : (x; v) 2 Ig, for some partition I0 of (X  V)nI. Thus
EVI1(a) = S + S1 and EVI2(a) = S + S2 where
S =
X
(x;v)2(XV)nI
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa;I0(x;v)))
S1 =
X
(x;v)2I
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa;I1(x;v))) =
X
x2X
a(x)Pr(~v)~v(pa;I)
S2 =
X
(x;v)2I
a(x)Pr(v)v(pa;I2(x;v))) =
X
x2X
a(x)Pr(~v)~v(pa;f(x;~v)g):
By Proposition 1, pa;I = pa;~v and pa;f(x;~v)g = px;~v. So ~v(pa;I) = ~v(pa;~v) = ~v(a) and
~v(pa;f(x;~v)g) = ~v(px;~v) = ~v(x). Thus
S1 =
X
x2X
a(x)Pr(~v)~v(a) = Pr(~v)~v(a)
X
x2X
a(x) = Pr(~v)~v(a)
S2 =
X
x2X
a(x)Pr(~v)~v(x) = Pr(~v)
X
x2X
a(x)~v(x):
So
EVI1(a)  EVI2(a) = S1   S2 = Pr(~v)
 
~v(a) 
X
x2X
a(x)~v(x)
!
:
As Pr(~v) 6= 0 and ~v(a) 6=Px2X a(x)~v(x), we deduce EVI1(a) 6= EVI2(a): 
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